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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

Who did the legislature, in giving this authority, intend to protect-the public as such or the public as composed of individuals?
The breach of a duty, imposed by an ordinance, which is owed to
individuals gives rise to civil liability, but this is not true where the
ordinance is meant to protect the public in general. The court in
the principal case failed to differentiate between these two concepts,
which in the writer's opinion is of paramount importance. The
majority of cases in the United States hold that the duty is owed
to the municipal corporation and that the abutting owners and
occupants cannot be made liable to individuals for injuries as a
result of failure to comply with the ordinance. For an accumulation
of these cases, see Annot. 24 A.L.R. 387 (1923).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, by creating this
new liability, has done that which few other courts of our land have
deemed necessary. As our country grows and society becomes more
complex, certain steps need to be taken to insure the safety of the
public against injuries of this nature. The desirable attributes of
these measures must be weighed against the burdens they create,
and the burden of constant surveillance or increased liability insurance on the owners and occupants may greatly outweigh the
benefits so gained.
I. A. P., Jr.
NuisANcE-AEsrarIc GR ONDS H=L VALID FOR INJUNCTIv
REE AGAINST LAWFUL Busnmss.-Ds operated and maintained a
used automobile sales business located on their land, outside the
corporate limits of a city, not subject to zoning regulations or restrictive covenants; situated, however, across a major highway from a
theretofore exclusively residential area within the corporate limits.
Ps sued to enjoin Ds on the grounds that the business constituted a
nuisance per accidens or in fact, because of excessive lighting, noise,
unsightliness, and diminution of value of Ps"property. Held, affirming the circuit court's decree, that Ds shall remove from their land
all automobiles, trucks, light poles, wires, lights, equipment, installations and structures used by them in the conduct of the used car
business. Martin v. Williams, 93 S.E.2d 835 (W. Va. 1956) (8-2
decision).
An examination of the facts in the opinion indicates the insufficiency of the other alleged grounds for relief, and reveals the apparent conclusion that the aesthetic argument was the major
consideration relied upon by the court in reaching its decision. If it
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was not, then the order that Ds remove all of their equipment, etc.,
was unnecessary.
The question of whether or not aesthetics should be considered
as an acceptable legal factor to be employed in determining injunctive relief may soon become one of primary importance in our
expanding society.
The general view of the courts is stated in the case of In re
Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525 (1920),
"aesthetic considerations alone or as the main end do not afford
sufficient foundation for imposing limitations upon the use of property under the police power." Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va.
456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915); Young v. St. Martin's Church, 361 Pa. 505,
64 A.2d 814 (1949). The court in Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21,
50 N.W.2d 592 (1951), stated, "that a thing is unsightly or offends
the aesthetic sense does not ordinarily make it a nuisance or afford
grounds for injunctive relief." See also, Gionfriddo v. Town of
Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 81 A.2d 266 (1951). "Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity... ." City of Passaic v. PatersonBill Posting Co., 72 N.J. 285,
62 Adt. 267 (1920). In the case of Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La.
76, 3 So.2d 281 (1941), the court said, "in the absence of legal zoning prohibition any business establishment may be established or
located in a residential district, however it may affect the property
values, unless by its very nature, its operation shall physically annoy
the inhabitants."
In the past thirty years, however, views contrary to the general
rule have been expressed. Seldom do these dissents conclude without reservation that aesthetics does have a valid position in the law,
but all assert that someday aesthetics should be afforded legal recognition. ParkersburgBuilders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va.
608, 191 S.E. 368, 192 S.E. 291 (1937); State ex rel. Civello v. New
Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as
Nuisances, 25 CoRmELL L.Q. 1 (1939); Ingalls, The Law of Aesthetics, 28 A.B.A.J. 191 (1937). The general opinion of this group was
summarized by the court in Perlmutterv. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182
N.E. 5 (1932): "Beauty may not be queen, but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect."
The basic question raised in the principal case, therefore, is
whether or not a court of equity can justifiably extinguish a lawful
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business solely, or mainly, on the ground that its appearance is
unsightly. Perhaps the answer can be ascertained by an examination of both the reasons given in refusing to afford a place for aesthetics in the law, and the results which could be reasonably anticipated if the question is answered affirmatively.
"[T]he courts perhaps feel that the recognition of sight nuisances would necessitate protracted control by the court and inordinately enlarge a field already unwieldy and governed by a myriad of
shifting values." Note, 25 VA. L. REV. 461 (1938). More specifically,
the difficulty in determining what causes an actionable injury to
the aesthetic sensibilities of the individual should be an added
deterrent to the courts not to enter this field. Note, 44 W. VA. L.Q.

58 (1938).
The argument that such determinations would present no more
of a problem in cases involving aesthetics than in cases involving
noise or odor is of little value. Comment, 2 U. PrTr. L. REv. 191
(1935). Compare the probable results in the opinions of a number
of judges from diversified areas in a case involving a fertilizer factory or a boisterous dance hall in an unzoned, unrestricted, unincorporated residential area, as against a case involving the aesthetic
qualities of a building, old or modernistic, or an art gallery, or an
enclosed show room for new automobiles, or perhaps a decrepit old
house in similar surroundings. What possible criterion can be used;
what possible results can be accurately forecast?
The more probable, final result in a case involving aesthetics,
as opposed to those dealing with noise or odor, should also be taken
into account. That which emits offensive odors may be filtered or
sweetened. Hannum v. Gruber,346 Pa. 417,31 A.2d 99 (1943). That
which is noisy may be muted or restricted. Ritz v. Woman's Club of
Charleston, 114 W. Va. 675, 173 S.E. 564, 182 S.E. 92 (1934). But
that which is allegedly unsightly may not be practically capable of
modification, and may too often result in the annihilation of a lawful business and the corresponding loss of sacred property rights.
Authority for such an assertion is the principal case.
The results of two pertinent cases should be observed. Yeager v. Traylor, 306 Pa. 530, 160 Atl. 108 (1932), is perhaps the
only case holding squarely in favor of employing aesthetic considerations in granting injunctive relief. The court found against the
defendant, but the decree was for inconsequential modification, not
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extinction, of the lawful business involved. Fortunately, the business
structure was capable of such modification, or the result might well
have been more drastic.
Feldsteinv. Kammauf, 121 A.2d 716 (Md. 1956), was decided one
month after the principal case. It involved a junk yard located in a
partially residential area. The court upheld the injunction on several grounds, but refused to order the defendant to conceal his
junk material from plaintiffs sight, because to do so "would in effect
put appellant out of a lawful business."
An examination of the relevant West Virginia cases reveals that
in each one the theory, that injunctive relief should be granted on
aesthetic grounds, was rejected. Fruthv. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va.
456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915); Nunley v. City of Montgomery, 94 W. Va.
189, 117 S.E. 888 (1923); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v.
Barrack, supra.
By way of dictum in the Barrack case, the majority opinion indicated that if the unsightly business involved-a junk yard-had been
located in an exclusive residential area, relief might have been
granted. In the same case, however, Judge Kenna, in a concurring
opinion, sharply dissented with that dictum pointing out that not
only would such a decision be contrary to the existing law in our
state, but that it would also be a violation of private property rights.
He further stated, "it seems palpable that in a state where the courts
have held the legislative exercise of the police power is unconstitutional is based solely upon aesthetic considerations, the court should
not extend their own power beyond that of the legislature by holding
that they have the right to enjoin as a nuisance that which is merely
unsightly." Such an argument appears to be reasonable in view of
the result in the case under discussion.
The court in Perry Mount Park Cemetery Asen v. Netzal, 274
Mich. 97, 264 N.W. 303 (1936), in reversing a decree similar to the
one upheld by our court, was even more bluntly direct in its criticism
of the lower court's action, stating, "the decree goes too far. It
strikes down defendant's business. It should regulate and not
destroy."
A pertinent reference to courts called upon to decide similar
cases is Demarest v. Hardham, 34 N.J. Eq. 469 (1887). The court
said, "to grant their [plaintiff's] prayer is to destroy the defendant's
business. Power attended with such disastrous consequences should
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always be exercised sparingly, and with the utmost caution. All
doubts should be resolved against its exercise."
In view of the legal history of aesthetics, the almost unanimous
reluctance of the courts to recognize it as a valid consideration, and
the possible consequences incident to this court's decision, it is
hoped that courts in the future will exercise the utmost diligence
and judgment in deciding whether or not to grant injunctive relief
based on aesthetic grounds.
C. H. B., Jr.
TAXATIoN-DISBURSEMENTS To FRUSTRATE STATE AND MuNiainAL
LAws-DEDUCIONS AS BusmsS EXPENSEs NOT ALLOWED.-P owned

and operated slot machines within the city of Wheeling in violation
of W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 10, § 1 (Michie 1949), and of § 32 of
Ordinance 38 of the city of Wheeling. By agreement between P
and city authorities P was permitted to operate the slot machines
illegally. Periodically, after checks by the city police department
as to the number of machines operated, fines of $100.00 and costs
were imposed by the judge of the police court upon the operation
of each machine in the name of the proprietor of the establishment
where the machines were located. These fines were paid by P. P
deducted these fines from his taxable income as ordinary and necessary business expenses under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23 (a) (1),
53 STAT. 12 (now INT.REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162). The Tax Court
did not allow this deduction. Upon petition to the United States
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, held, that the money used in
payment of fines, although a part of P's income, was not deductible
under the Internal Revenue Code, because it was incurred in
violation of a state statute and a city ordinance; any such tax deduction would contravene the laws of the state. A second issue, not discussed in this comment, concerned the amount of depreciation allowable on P's machines and was decided against P for insufficient
evidence. Judgment affirmed. Automatic Cigarette Sales Corp v.
Commissioner, 234 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1956).
The decision in the case expresses the majority view. Lilly v.
Commissioner,348 U.S. 90 (1952); Commissioner v. Heininger,320
U.S. 467 (1948); Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir.
1956); Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d
276 (5th Cir. 1945); Clark v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 48 (1952);
Davenshire v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 958 (1949). These cases
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